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FIRST DAY 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - July 29, 1986 
SECTION ONE 
1. Phil Plaintiff was severely injured in an automobile crash in the 
City of Clifton Forge, Virginia, when the vehicle in which he was a passenger 
was struck from the rear by an old car driven by Dave Defendant. At the scene 
of the accident Phil detected the odor of alcohol about the person of Dave and 
mentioned the fact to the investigating officer, who asked Dave if he had been 
drinking. Dave, who was unsteady on his feet, told the officer he refused to 
answer that question until he had talked to his sister, who was his attorney. 
Phil was told after the accident by some of Dave's co-workers that Dave had 
automobile liability insurance, but his policy may have lapsed for failure to 
pay the premium which was due a week before the accident. 
Subsequently Phil filed a civil action against Dave in the Circuit 
Court for $200,000, demanding both compensatory and punitive damages •. 
After filing his Motion for Judgment, Phil's attorney also properly 
filed and served upon Dave a request for Dave to admit: · 
(1) That he had in fact been drinking alcohol prior to the time of the 
accident, and 
(2) That his vehicle was currently insured by a policy issued through 
an insurance company licensed to do business in Virginia. 
Dave, after denying liability responded to the request to admit as 
follows: 
(1) That the question whether he was drinking prior to the crash was a 
jury question, and he refused to admit or deny it. 
(2) That he objected to the question whether he had insurance on the 
grounds that this information would be inadmissible at the trial. 
At a pretrial conference, Phil's attorney asked the Court to rule on 
the sufficiency of defendant's respons~s to the Requests for Admission. 
{a) How should the Court rule on the sufficiency of the response to 
the request to admit that Dave had been drinking prior to the crash? 
(b) How should the Court rule on the objection to the request to admit 
that Dave had insurance on his car? 
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2. In February 1984, Mary Avery and Tom Avery, her husband, were 
driving through Nickelsville, Virginia, when their car was struck head-on by 
an 18 wheel tractor-trailer truck. Mary was thrown clear of the car and was 
uninjured; however, Tom was severely injured. 
In November, 19$4, Tom filed an action at law against Fred Farley, the 
owner and driver of the tractor-trailer, in the Circuit Court of Scott County~ 
Virginia, seeking compensation for the injuries he received, and for punitive 
damages. In the month of September 1985, before the case came to trial, both 
Tom and Fred died as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. 
Mary qualified as Executrix of Tom's estate, and then consults you 
about the pending suit filed by Tom. 
(a) What must be done to revive the law suit and by whom? 
(b) When the case is revived, may damages be recovered for Tom's pain 
and suffering resulting from the accident, if warranted by the proof? 
{c) When the case is revived, may punitive damages be recovered, if 
warranted by the proof? 
(d) What other elements of damage, if any, may be recovered, if 
warranted by the proof? 
* * * * * 
3. John Gantry, who was charged with first degree murder alleged to 
have been committed in the City of Salem, Virginia, had a long criminal record 
in the Roanoke Valley, which, along with the revolting details of the pending 
murder charge, had been extensively publicized in the local and regional media. 
His attorney filed the appropriate motion for a change of venue citing 
the volume of publicity, the graphic gory details concerning the killing, and 
the details of John's criminal record. Even though the Commonwealth's 
Attorney did not deny that there had been extensive publicity, the court 
overruled the motion. 
A large panel of veniremen was summoned for the trial, and after five 
days a jury was selected. 
John's attorney was denied permission by the Judge to question on voir 
dire each potential juror out of the presence of the other potential jurors. 
John's attorney then filed a motion that the jury be sequestered for the 
trial, which the court overruled. 
During the trial John relied upon an alibi defense, and in his 
testimony denied the prosecution's evidence which consisted of proof of a 
homocide during the commission of a burglary. 
During cross-examination, the Commonwealth's Attorney asked John if he 
had ever been convicted of a felony, and if so the number of times. The court 
sustained an objection to the question. In rebuttal, the court refused to 
allow the Commonwealth's Attorney to introduce court records of John's five 
previous felony convictions. 
SECTION ONE PAGE THREE 
John was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 90 years in 
prison. 
(a) Was John entitled to a change of venue: 
(b) Did the court err in refusing to allow John's attorney to question 
en voir dire each potential juror out of the presence of the others? 
(c) Does John have the right to have the jury sequestered? 
(d) Did the court err in refusing to permit the Commonwealth's 
Attorney to question John about prior felonies, and to present evidence of 
them? 
* * * * * 
4. Paul Plainer, a Maryland resident who operates a lumberyard in 
Maryland, entered into a contract with William Woods, a Virginia resident, 
under which Woods sold Plainer 50 train carloads of logs. The contract 
provided that the logs were to be cut by Woods from Blackacre in King and 
Queen County, Virginia, and were to be delivered to Plainer between October 1 
and December 1, 1985. On September 15, 1985, the standing timber on Blackacre 
was destroyed by a forest fire, as the result of which Woods was unable to 
fulfill his contract with Plainer. On January 16, 1986, Plainer filed a 
complaint against Woods in the United States District Court for the Easter·n 
District of Virginia in which he alleged a breach of contract by Woods and 
sought damages in the amount of $22,500. Woods filed an answer denying 
liability to Plainer on the ground that the timber on Blackacre had been 
destroyed by fire which was started by lighting and that, under the contract, 
if performance was rendered impossible by an act of God, Woods was not liable. 
Woods immediately conducted the following discovery: 
(1) He filed a request for Plainer to admit that a copy of the 
contract, which was attached to the request, was genuine and that it had been 
executed by Plainer. The copy of the contract contained a provision relieving 
Woods from performance if such was made impossible by an act of God. Plainer 
did not respond to the request within the time required by the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure; 
(2) After proper notice to Plainer's attorney, he took the deposition 
of Smokey Warden, the fire warden of the district in which Blackacre was 
located. Smokey testified that he actually saw lightning strike a tree in 
Blackacre which started the fire, that he and his crew fought the fire for six 
days before it was contained, and that the timber on Blackacre was completely 
destroyed by the fire; and 
(3) He filed an interrogatory to Plainer asking for the identification 
of all persons having knowledge of how the fire was started. Plainer, who 
answered the interrogatory before the deposition of Warden was taken, stated 
that he knew of no one who had such knowledge. 
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Woods thereupon filed a motion asking that summary judgment be entered 
in his favor. The motion was supported by a copy of the request for 
admissions filed by Woods and an affidavit by Woods representing that Plainer 
had not responded to it within the time required by the rules, a transcript of 
the deposition of Warden which had been filed with the court, and the 
interrogatory to Plainer and Plainer's answer thereto which had been filed 
with the court. 
Plainer's lawyer asks you, a recent law school graduate who has just 
passed the bar examination, whether he has a basis upon which he can 
successfully oppose Woods' motion for summary judgment. What would you tell 
him? 
* * * * * 
5. On January 2, 1986, Wyatt Kern filed a bill in chancery against 
Durbin McMullin in the Circuit Court of the City of Hampton seeking to enjoin 
McMullin from removing the sailboat "MAC'S FOLLY" from its moorings at the 
Hampton Yacht Club and to require McMullin to deliver the boat to him without 
delay. In his bill Kern alleged that McMullin had agreed in writing to sell 
him the sailboat for $35,000, that Kern had paid McMullin $10,000 as a down 
payment and that the balance was due on delivery of the boat. He also alleged 
that McMullin had agreed orally to deliver the boat to Kern before Christmas 
Day of 1985 but that despite this agreement, the repeated requests by Kern for 
delivery of the boat and a tender by Kern of the balance of the purchase · 
price, McMullin had failed to make delivery, giving one excuse after another. 
Finally, Kern alleged that McMullin had become irritated with him and on one 
occasion told him that if Kern would not be patient then he just might take 
the boat to Annapolis and sell it. In his answer, McMullin asserted that the 
written agreement was silent as to delivery, that although he had agreed 
orally to deliver the boat to Kern as soon as it was ready, he had not agreed 
on any specific date; that he had some repair work to do on the boat and was 
delayed in getting a replacement winch; and that the short delay would not 
prejudice Kern as he had no plans to take the boat anywhere. The matter was 
heard before the Court on February 18, 1986, at which time the parties 
testified in the manner set out in their pleadings. The Court, believing that 
McMullin, was acting in good faith, entered a final order denying the 
injunction and dismissing the complaint. 
On May 1st, Kern encountered his friend, Hatcher Montague, who asked 
Kern whether he had gotten an injunction against McMullin. When Kern told 
Montague of the Court's action, Montague told Kern that he had happened to be 
in Annapolis on the 25th of April and by chance had encountered at a party a 
young man named Jim Smith who was telling everyone how pleased he was to have 
bought the sailboat "MAC'S FOLLY" from Durbin McMullin of Hampton and that he 
expected to take delivery of the boat on or about May 15th, the date on which 
McMullin had promised to bring the boat to Annapolis. Smith revealed that he 
had agreed to pay McMullin $43,000 for "MAC'S FOLLY". 
Kern immediately advised his counsel of the foregoing. Was there any 
action which could be taken in the Circuit Court proceedings to prevent 
McMullin from taking the boat to Annapolis? 
* * * * * 
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6. In early November of 1985, John Gray, a duly licensed building 
contractor doing business in the City of Bristol, Virginia went to the local 
office of Star Insurance Company as the undisclosed agent of James Blue, 
another highly reputable, duly licensed contractor doing business in Bristol, 
and asked whether the Company would execute a performance bond for $200,000, 
assuring the proper cqnstruction of a warehouse by Gray for Dixie Trucking 
C9rporation. After studying the plans and specifications shown by Gray, and · 
on his payment of a binder fee of $100, Star Insurance Company delivered to 
Gray a letter committing the insurance company to issue a performance bond for 
the warehouse job to Gray upon presentation, within sixty days, of a completed 
application showing Gray to have a net worth in excess of $1,000,000, and ' 
payment of the balance of the premium. 
On December 15, 1985, James Blue, came into the office of Star 
Insurance Company, presented the completed application form for the warehouse 
job showing Blue to have a net worth of $1,250,000, tendered the premium and 
asked the company to issue to him the performance·bond on the same warehouse 
job described to the insurance company by John Gray. B.lue explained that he 
had sent Gray to Star Insurance as his agent in November, a fact which Gray 
acknowledged, but no disclosure of the agency had been made. He explained 
that the job was exactly the same as it had been when Gray described it in 
November. Star Insurance Company comes to your office and tells you that 
since November 1985 it had issued more performance bonds than it regarded as 
prudent. 
Must the insurance company issue a performance bond to James Blue? 
* * * * * 
7. On May 15, 1985, Holcum Page, the owner of a farm in Culpeper 
County, Virginia, entered into an oral contract with William Wheat, a corn 
broker, by which he agreed to sell to Wheat his entire crop of growing corn 
for a price of $750. Under the terms of the agreement, Wheat agreed to 
harvest the corn when it was fully matured. When the corn had matured and was 
ready to be cut and removed, Wheat tendered to Page the agreed purchase price 
and demanded that he be permitted to go upon the farm to cut and remove the 
corn. At that time corn prices had risen and the crop was worth $1,000. Page 
refused payment of the tendered purchase price and would not permit Wheat to 
cut and remove the corn. In an action by Wheat to recover, $450, the loss of 
his total profit if he had the corn to sell, Page filed as his only defense a 
plea of Statute of Frauds. 
Is Wheat entitled to recover? 
* * * * * 
8. In 1980 Walter Freemason purchased a parcel of land in New Kent 
County, Virginia and built a home on it. The property fronted 200 feet on 
Route 999 (which ran in an east-west direction at this point) and extended 
southwardly between parallel lines a distance of 200 feet. In his deed 
Freemason was also granted an easement thirty feet wide which ran along the 
western line of his property in a north-south direction and then continued 
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southwardly through the property of Trumpet Enterprises (Trumpet) for 
approximately 400 feet to Route 607 (which ran roughly parallel to Route 
999). The easement was granted to Freemason for use as a private roadway to 
provide him access to Route 607 from Route 999. 
On February 20, 1986, the Board of Supervisors of New Kent County 
closed a portion of Route 607 and relocated the roadway southward. The effect · 
of this change was to separate Route 607 from Mr. Freemason's private roadway, 
leaving the easement a mere cul-de-sac which did not connect with any public 
roadway. At the same time the County opened Route 333 which intersected both 
Route 999 and Route 607 and provided Freemason and others with an alternative 
but longer access to Route 607. 
On March 5th, after notification that the County Board of Supervisors 
had realigned Route 607, Trumpet constructed a fence along its northern 
property line. The fence crossed Freemason's easement and precluded its use 
by Freemason. 
On March 25, 1986, Freemason filed a bill in equity in the Circuit 
Court for New Kent County praying for an injunction restraining Trumpet from 
interfering with his use of the private roadway or in the alternative, for 
damages equal to the fair market value of the easement which for all practical 
purposes had been appropriated by Trumpet for its own use. 
Trumpet responded that Route 607 had been lawfully relocated by the 
Board of Supervisors, that Freemason had an alternate route from Route 999 to 
Route 607, that Freemason no longer had any right to access through its 
property and that Trumpet could put its land to any lawful use. 
Assuming that the action taken by the County Board of Supervisors was 
lawful, was Trumpet entitled to erect his fence across the private roadway? 
* * * * * 
9. Bob Borrower, recently discharged from military service, sought to 
borrow $10,000 to start a business. First Bank of Manassas agreed to make the 
loan provided Borrower could get his Uncle Simon to endorse the note as an 
accommodation maker, which he did. The note provided that it would be due in 
full on November 15, 1986. Six months later Borrower needed additional 
capital and sought $20,000 more from First Bank. First Bank required Simon's 
endorsement as before and, in addition, required Borrower to assign 1000 
shares of stock in National Telephone Company which Borrower had recently 
inherited from his grandfather. Borrower delivered the $20,000 note endorsed 
by Simon and himself and the stock together with an appropriate instrument 
which provided that the stock was to be held as security for both the original 
loan of $10,000 and the new loan of $20,000. The second note provided that it 
would be due in full on June 15, 1986. On receiving these papers First Bank 
issued its cashier's check to Borrower for $20,000. 
By June 15, 1986, Borrower's business had failed and First Bank 
demanded that he pay the $20,000 loan. When Borrower refused the Bank made 
the same demand on Simon and Simon promptly made the payment. Simon then 
wrote First Bank a letter advising that the stock it held as s~curity for both 
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notes was traded on the New York Stock Exchange and was worth $60,000. He 
asked that First Bank transfer a portion of the stock sufficient for Simon to 
recoup his payment of the $20,000. When the Bank refused Simon's request 
Simon comes to your law office to ask whether he can proceed by a suit in 
equity to compel First Bank to make the transfer of $20,000 worth of stock of 
National Telephone CQmpany. How do you respond? 
* * * * * 
10. Sonny and Cheri Probono were married in Madison, Virginia at 
Cheri's family home in 1968. After the wedding they went to West Virginia, 
where Sonny worked in a coal mine. They had no children, and Cheri on several 
occasions expressed her desire to get a job to pass the time and bring in a 
little extra money. Whenever she talked abou.t getting a job, Sonny would 
state that he made plenty of money for both of them and that no wife of his 
would ever work. 
On October 11, 1979, Cheri and her friend Patsy left a church circle 
meeting early and arrived at the Probono home to find Sonny in a compromising 
position with a clerk from the local five and dime. A terrible scene ensued. 
Finally, Sonny threw his clothes into a suitcase and stormed out vowing to go 
somewhere where Cheri could never find him. 
Cheri returned to her family's home in Madison in November 1979 and. 
filed for a divorce~ vinculo on adultery grounds in the Circuit Court of 
Madison County on July 6, 1980. An order of publication was properly entered 
under Section 20-104 of the Code of Virginia, but Sonny did not appear. On 
her testimony corroborated by that of Patsy, Cheri was granted a divorce and 
was awarded $100 per month in alimony. Since she did not know Sonny's 
whereabouts, Cheri could not collect any of the alimony which she had been 
awarded. 
In 1984 Cheri heard from a friend that Sonny had settled in Richmond, 
and she immediately brought suit against him in the proper court in Richmond 
for the alimony which he had not paid and the interest that had accrued 
thereon. 
Sonny filed pleadings which raised three jurisdictional issues: 
(1) The Circuit Court of Madison County had no jurisdiction to grant 
Cheri a divorce because she had not lived in Virginia for one year before 
bringing the suit; 
(2) The Circuit Court of Madison County had no jurisdiction to grant 
Cheri a divorce because Sonny was not living in Virginia when the suit was 
filed and the alleged grounds for divorce did not occur in Virginia; 
(3) The Circuit Court of Madison County had no jurisdiction to award 
Cheri a 1 imony. 
(a) How should the Richmond court rule on each of Sonny's contentions? 
(b) Were the divorce decree and the award of alimony valid? 
* * * * * 
